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Allocation rules for global donors
Alec Morton∗, Ashwin Arulselvan†Ranjeeta Thomas‡
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Abstract
In recent years, donors such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation,
have made an enormous contribution to the reduction of the global burden
of disease. It has been argued that such donors should prioritise interven-
tions based on their cost-effectiveness, that is to say, the ratio of costs to
benefits. Against this, we argue that the donor should fund not the most
cost-effective interventions, but rather interventions which are just cost-
ineffective for the country, thus encouraging the country to contribute its
own domestic resources to the fight against disease. We demonstrate that
our proposed algorithm can be justified within the context of a model
of the problem as a leader-follower game, in which a donor chooses to
subsidise interventions which are implemented by a country. We argue
that the decision rule we propose provides a basis for the allocation of aid
money which is efficient, fair and sustainable.
1 Introduction
The last fifteen years have seen huge strides forward in humanity’s ability to
protect itself against disease. According to the United Nations (2015), improved
prevention and treatment has saved around 37 million lives over this period and
6.2 million lives from malaria (most of the latter being those of children). 13.6
million people living with HIV are now on antiretroviral therapy: many of these
people would be dead without treatment.
Although some of this progress is due to economic growth and technological
progress, a considerable share is due to aid money from rich countries and phil-
anthropic individuals. In particular, the Global Fund to Fight Aids Tuberculosis
and Malaria has disbursed $27 billion to low and middle income countries to
assist them in funding treatments for these three diseases since its founding in
2002 (The Global Fund, n.d.).
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Of course, funding is not unlimited. Many rich countries are preoccupied
with their own problems: slow growth, ageing populations, the hangover of the
financial crisis, the threat of terrorism and the like. In this environment, overseas
development aid can be a tough sell to a sceptical public. Private individuals
are not constrained in the same way, but even the largest private fortunes are
finite. This is reflected in the trends in development assistance for health (DAH).
Between the 2000 and 2009 DAH rose at an annualised growth rate of 11.3%
with an average annual increase of $290.4 mn (2015 US$) in the millennium
development goals (MDG) focus areas and $98.6 mn (2015 US$) in the non-
MDG focus areas. Between 2010 and 2015 however, the annualised growth rate
fell to 1.2%, with DAH for HIV/AIDS and other focus areas (with the exception
of maternal and newborn/child health) remaining flat or decreasing (Dielman
et al 2016).
How, then, should aid money be spent? Several commentators have ad-
vocated the use of cost-effectiveness analysis (Center for Global Development,
2013; Teerawattananon et al, 2013). In its simplest form, cost-effectiveness anal-
ysis involves prioritising investments in decreasing order of benefit to cost ratio,
that is to say “value for money”. In health economics in particular, the benefits
are normally operationalised as some sort of health benefit: for example infec-
tions averted or life years or quality adjusted life years (QALYs) gained (for
more comprehensive expositions, see Tan-Torres Edejer et al, 2003, Drummond
et al, 2015; Neumann et al, 2016 and Wilkinson et al., 2016). While assess-
ing these cost-effectiveness ratios for a given set of healthcare interventions can
involve substantial clinical and epidemiological expertise, the underlying cost-
effectiveness principle is familiar and intuitive.
In this note we take issue with the argument that donors should fund the
most cost-effective interventions, with cost-effectiveness defined as total cost
of implementation per unit of benefit, at least when the partner countries are
middle-income or at the upper end of the lower-income scale. We maintain that a
disadvantage of such rules is that they result in the crowding out of indigenous
financing of interventions, and thus result in under-allocation of resources to
healthcare. We propose an alternative rule for such countries whereby donors
subsidise interventions which are “at the margin” from the point of view of
the recipient country, that is to say in interventions which are only just cost-
ineffective for that country.
To our knowledge this is the first analytic study of this issue, and accordingly
there is little relevant literature to review. There is an empirical literature on
the so-called “fungibility” of aid (e.g. Lu et al, 2010; Roodman, 2012; Van de
Sijpe, 2013; Dykstra et al, 2015) but this is more concerned with empirical esti-
mation of the extent to which external money displaces local financing. There
is a classic technical literature on game theoretic analysis of the relationships
between different players in the aid system (e.g. Svensson, 2000; Martens et
al, 2002), but this differs from our study, which is much more operationally
focussed on the derivation of decision rules for one party - the donor - in this
relationship.
Our study can be seen as falling in a tradition of studies which seek to
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generalise the rules of cost-effectiveness analysis by showing how these rules can
be derived within a formal optimisation model (e.g. Weinstein and Zeckhauser,
1973; Morton, 2014, van Baal et al., 2016; Morton et al, 2016; van Baal et al,
2018). The optimisation framework we use here is bilevel programming, which
has to our knowledge not hitherto been used in this context: specifically the
model which we use can be considered as a bilevel knapsack model. There are
quite a few bilevel knapsack models that are present in the operations research
literature (Caprara et al., 2013). Most of them cannot be applied to model our
application as these models involve the leader and the follower competing for
a common resource or the follower is pessimistic with a conflicting objective.
Dempe and Richter’s (2000) model is perhaps the closest to the one that we
are proposing. However, their model involves in the leader just determining the
capacity of the follower’s knapsack and it does not offer the flexibility in terms
of individual project subsidies.
The overall structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present the
intuition behind our rule and demonstrate it with respect to a realistic numerical
example. In Section 3, to make our argument precise, we provide a formal model
of the problem of donor aid allocation as a leader-follower (Stackelberg) game
and show that our Section 2 algorithm can be understood as a heuristic version
of the optimal solution to this game. In Section 4, we discuss the prospects for
using the model we propose to guide resource allocation to countries. Section 5
concludes.
2 Concept and example
A popular approach to prioritisation in healthcare is to evaluate possible health-
care interventions (henceforth “projects”) on the basis of their incremental cost-
effectiveness ratio (ICER). This ICER is the ratio of the incremental costs to
the incremental benefits relative to the current standard of care, with the lat-
ter measured in a metric such as QALYs. A common prescription is to invest
only in those projects which meet some cost-effectiveness threshold. This idea
has the merit of being both grounded in economic theory and also practically
implementable: it informs decision making in many countries.
Suppose a donor (henceforth “D”) wishes to interact with a country (“C”)
which makes decisions on this basis. How should D make decisions? What we
propose in this paper is that D rather than selecting cost-effective projects on
C’s behalf, D should frame its role as deciding which projects to subsidise in
order to make them cost-effective for C.
The intuition behind our proposed approach can be depicted visually in
Figure 1. In this figure the diagonal represents the line of marginal cost-
effectiveness. The green squares above the diagonal represent the low CER
projects which will be implemented by C (before subsidy) and the red circles
below the diagonal represent high CER projects which will be rejected by C
before subsidy. The decision of the donor is thus to choose which (red) projects
to subsidise so that they are brought onto the diagonal line.
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Figure 1: Intuition behind the Donor’s allocation rule
This suggests an approach to prioritisation whereby D calculates its own
Subsidy Effectiveness Ratio (SER) for projects by using the required subsidy,
rather than the full cost of the project, as the numerator in the SER.
We demonstrate the approach numerically with the following example, based
on earlier consultancy work. Consider a middle-income country which faces a
range of projects in the areas of TB, malaria and HIV treatment and preven-
tion, with costs and benefits (the latter measured in DALYs) and ICER as
shown in Table 1. These projects may be considered to be targeted at separate
populations and so are independent.
The first step is to order the projects in order of ICERs and identify those
which have an ICER less than C’s threshold, which we consider for the purposes
of this example to be $100 per DALY averted. These projects are shown in Table
2.
For the remaining projects, we now perform some additional calculations,
shown in Table 3. The raw data for our calculations are the costs and benefits
scores (columns 1 and 2) which we denote as c and b. To make the projects cost-
effective for a country with a $100 per DALY threshold, D will have to subsidise
these projects by paying an amount δ equal to the ICER (column 3) of the
project minus 100, all multiplied by the DALY benefits of the project (column
4) (b(c/b − 100)). The balance of funds required to implement each project is
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Table 1: Cost and benefit data for HIV, Malaria and TB projects
Disease -
Intervention
Costs ($) Benefits (DALYs) ICER
HIV - ART
-Firstline
128,222,171 227,193 564.38
HIV - Blood safety 15,037,684 181,862 82.69
HIV - Condom
provision
8,569,559 278,120 30.81
HIV - Condom
Social Marketing
7,154,969 1,102,885 6.49
HIV - IDU
community outreach
and peer education
13,078,729 350,754 37.29
HIV - IDU needle
and syringe
exchange
13,904,682 372,905 37.29
HIV - Mass media 290,738 77,530 3.75
HIV - MSM 57,778,601 8,906,143 6.49
HIV - PMTCT 3,976,386 37,158 107.01
HIV - PMTCT
Screening
45,655,271 954,382 47.84
HIV - Safe injection 10,597,302 46,075 230.00
HIV - School based
education programs
4,319,850 39,178 110.26
HIV - STI
management
184,701,755 7,121,032 25.94
HIV - VCT 30,774,512 643,314 47.84
HIV - Workplace 276,476 4,211 65.66
HIV - Youth focused
interventions
80,232 1,222 65.66
Total HIV 524,418,917 20,343,962
Malaria - ACT -
adults public+none
(testing and
treatment)
79,638 4,580 17.39
Malaria - ACT -
children (testing and
treatment)
773 44 17.39
Malaria - IRS
households
116,207,217 607,461 191.30
Malaria - LLIN 82,765,362 2,291,876 36.11
Total Malaria 199,052,990 2,903,961
TB - DOTS 227,708,000 1,370,084 166.20
TB - MDR-TB 75,874,050 116,290 652.46
TB - Standard
Diagnostic Test
15,049,840 95,290 157.94
Total TB 318,631,890 1,581,664
Grand total 1,042,103,797 24,829,587
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met by C (c−δ) and is shown in (column 5), which finds the subsidised projects
(marginally) cost-effective. The donor then calculates a Subsidy Effectiveness
Ratio (SER, δ/b) by comparing the benefits to be realised with this required
subsidy (column 6). If for example, D has $153m, it may choose to implement
the projects shown in bold on the table, which are identified by lining projects
up in cost-effectiveness order and implementing projects successively in order of
SER. We can verify (column 7) that this does indeed exhaust the budget.
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Table 2: Projects which are already cost-effective given the country’s threshold
Disease -
Intervention
Costs ($) Benefits (DALYs) Country ICER
HIV - Blood safety 15,037,684 181,862 82.69
HIV - Youth focused
interventions
80,232 1,222 65.66
HIV - Workplace 276,476 4,211 65.66
HIV - VCT 30,774,512 643,314 47.84
HIV - PMTCT
Screening
45,655,271 954,382 47.84
HIV - IDU
community outreach
and peer education
13,078,729 350,754 37.29
HIV - IDU needle
and syringe
exchange
13,904,682 372,905 37.29
Malaria - LLIN 82,765,362 2,291,876 36.11
HIV - Condom
provision
8,569,559 278,120 30.81
HIV - STI
management
184,701,755 7,121,032 25.94
Malaria - ACT -
children (testing and
treatment)
773 44 17.39
Malaria - ACT -
adults public+none
(testing and
treatment)
79,638 4,580 17.39
HIV - Condom
Social Marketing
7,154,969 1,102,885 6.49
HIV - MSM 57,778,601 8,906,143 6.49
HIV - Mass media 290,738 77,530 3.75
Total 460,148,981 22,290,858
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Table 3: Worked example showing pattern of funding and subsidies of projects
Disease -
Intervention
1. Costs, c 2. Bene-
fits,
b
3.
Country
ICER,
c/b
4. Donor
Subsidy,
δ =
b(c/b− 100)
5. Country
contribu-
tion,
c− δ
6.
Donor
SER,
δ/b
7. Cumu-
lative cost
to Donor
TB - MDR-TB 75,874,050 116,290 652.46 64,245,063 11,628,987 552.46 328,081,913
HIV - ART
-Firstline
128,222,171 227,193 564.38 105,502,849 22,719,322 464.38 263,836,850
HIV - Safe
injection
10,597,302 46,075 230.00 5,989,780 4,607,523 130.00 158,334,001
Malaria - IRS
households
116,207,217 607,461 191.30 55,461,155 60,746,062 91.30 152,344,221
TB - DOTS 227,708,000 1,370,084 166.20 90,699,576 137,008,424 66.20 96,883,066
TB -
Standard
Diagnostic
Test
15,049,840 95,290 157.94 5,520,855 9,528,985 57.94 6,183,490
HIV - School
based
education
programs
4,319,850 39,178 110.26 402,063 3,917,787 10.26 662,634
HIV -
PMTCT
3,976,386 37,158 107.01 260,572 3,715,815 7.01 260,572
Total for
bold projects
367,261,292 2,149,170 152,344,220 214,917,071
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In this example C spends approximately $460m on interventions which are
already cost-effective for it, before D’s financing begins to kick in. Had D
spent money on these cost-effective interventions, it may well have crowded
out financing from C. Instead, D’s additional financing leverages substantial
amounts of additional funding ($215m) into the healthcare system over and
above what the country would have spent if left to its own devices. Thus,
D’s financing should be seen in the context of, and indeed as a stimulus to,
sustainable financing of the whole system.
Now consider the case where C and D do not agree on the assessment of
the benefits of the projects. There are many reasons why this might be so:
for example, D may wish to give priority involving children, but C may wish
to prioritise working age adults: or D may calculate gains in terms of DALYs
and C in terms of productivity losses). We consider a the case where C has a
preference for treating some diseases over others (perhaps because it deprioritises
diseases which affect politically marginal and social stigmatised populations).
Specifically we consider that while D’s assessment of the benefits remains as per
Table 1, C takes the view that the HIV interventions only realise thirty percent
of the benefits of Table 1 across the board. The country’s new priority ordering
and funded projects are as shown in Table 4.
Because of C’s reassessment of the benefits, HIV–condom provision (for ex-
ample) is no longer cost-effective for it. D calculates how much it will have to
pay in order to induce C to introduce the other projects and calculates its own
cost-effectiveness ratio for the projects which remain unfunded, as shown in Ta-
ble 5. The calculations are similar to the those of Table 3, differing only in that
now instead of there being a single agreed benefit b, there is C’s valuation of the
benefits v, and D’s valuation of the benefit w – for the formulae see the column
headings of the table. (Observe that the orderings by country ICER and donor
SER respectively, are no longer the same). Again D has $153m to invest, and
the top cost-effective projects on which to spend this money are again shown
in bold. This time, from its point of view, the most cost-effective projects to
subsidise are the HIV projects which C has left on the table. Because it uses
its budget subsidising such projects, it no longer has enough money to fund the
Malaria –IRS households project.
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Table 4: Priorities for C with reduced benefits from HIV projects
Disease - Intervention Costs Country’s
valuation
of Benefits
Donor’s
valuation
of Benefits
Country
ICER
HIV - ART -Firstline 128,222,171 68,158 227,193 1881.25
HIV - Safe injection 10,597,302 13,823 46,075 766.67
TB - MDR-TB 75,874,050 116,290 116,290 652.46
HIV - School based
education programs
4,319,850 11,753 39,178 367.54
HIV - PMTCT 3,976,386 11,147 37,158 356.71
HIV - Blood safety 15,037,684 54,558 181,862 275.63
HIV - Youth focused
interventions
80,232 367 1,222 218.88
HIV - Workplace 276,476 1,263 4,211 218.88
Malaria - IRS households 116,207,217 607,461 607,461 191.30
TB - DOTS 227,708,000 1,370,084 1,370,084 166.20
HIV - PMTCT Screening 45,655,271 286,315 954,382 159.46
HIV - VCT 30,774,512 192,994 643,314 159.46
TB - Standard Diagnostic
Test
15,049,840 95,290 95,290 157.94
HIV - IDU community
outreach and peer
education
13,078,729 105,226 350,754 124.29
HIV - IDU needle and
syringe exchange
13,904,682 111,871 372,905 124.29
HIV - Condom provision 8,569,559 83,436 278,120 102.71
HIV - STI management 184,701,755 2,136,309 7,121,032 86.46
Malaria - LLIN 82,765,362 2,291,876 2,291,876 36.11
HIV - Condom Social
Marketing
7,154,969 330,866 1,102,885 21.63
HIV - MSM 57,778,601 2,671,843 8,906,143 21.63
Malaria - ACT - children
(testing and treatment)
773 44 44 17.39
Malaria - ACT - adults
public+none (testing and
treatment)
79,638 4,580 4,580 17.39
HIV - Mass media 290,738 23,259 77,530 12.50
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Table 5: Priorities for C with reduced benefits from HIV projects
Disease - Intervention 1. Costs, c 2.
Country’s
valuation
of Benefits,
v
3. Country
ICER, c/v
4. Subsidy
required
make cost-
effective,
δ =
v(c/v − 100)
5. Donor’s
valuation
of Benefits,
w
6. Donor
SER, δ/w
7.
Cumulative
cost to
Donor
TB - MDR-TB 75,874,050 116,290 652.46 64,245,063 116,290 552.46 396,328,330
HIV - ART -Firstline 128,222,171 68,158 1881.25 121,406,374 227,193 534.38 332,083,266
HIV - Safe injection 10,597,302 13,823 766.67 9,215,046 46,075 200.00 210,676,892
Malaria - IRS households 116,207,217 607,461 191.30 55,461,155 607,461 91.30 201,461,846
HIV - School based
education programs
4,319,850 11,753 367.54 3,144,514 39,178 80.26 146,000,692
HIV - PMTCT 3,976,386 11,147 356.71 2,861,642 37,158 77.01 142,856,178
TB - DOTS 227,708,000 1,370,084 166.20 90,699,576 1,370,084 66.20 139,994,536
TB - Standard
Diagnostic Test
15,049,840 95,290 157.94 5,520,855 95,290 57.94 49,294,960
HIV - Blood safety 15,037,684 54,558 275.63 9,581,835 181,862 52.69 43,774,104
HIV - Youth focused
interventions
80,232 367 218.88 43,575 1,222 35.66 34,192,270
HIV - Workplace 276,476 1,263 218.88 150,159 4,211 35.66 34,148,694
HIV - PMTCT
Screening
45,655,271 286,315 159.46 17,023,797 954,382 17.84 33,998,535
HIV - VCT 30,774,512 192,994 159.46 11,475,105 643,314 17.84 16,974,738
HIV - IDU community
outreach and peer
education
13,078,729 105,226 124.29 2,556,118 350,754 7.29 5,499,633
HIV - IDU needle and
syringe exchange
13,904,682 111,871 124.29 2,717,543 372,905 7.29 2,943,515
HIV - Condom
provision
8,569,559 83,436 102.71 225,972 278,120 0.81 225,972
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D might take the view that if C assesses projects very differently from D,
D may require that C apply a higher cost-effectiveness threshold for its own
projects as a condition of funding. For example, if C chooses to put a lower
value on projects aimed at sex workers or sexual minorities in its own internal
valuation, it does not seem right that D should pick up such projects without
demanding that C provide some additional funding for some other projects
(otherwise C would financially benefit from its reluctance to provide to health
services to all of its citizens on an equitable basis).
We run some scenarios on our base model which we present in Figure 2
to show how the relative sums of money allocated by C and D respectively
change as we redo the calculations varying C’s threshold. As can be seen from
the figure, as C’s threshold is stepped up, the amount of financing that the
C contributes in the model increases – this is partly because increasing the
threshold tips some projects over from being subsidised to being entirely funded
by C but also because the amount of subsidy that C receives for any subsidised
project diminishes, as it requires less financial support to make it cost-effective.
D’s contribution fluctuates because D has a budget constraint which it cannot
exceed, but sometimes it chooses not to use its full budget (for example if it
only has half the amount necessary to make a project cost-effective, it does not
make sense to subsidise the project by that amount as this will not be sufficient
to change C’s decision).
What lessons might D draw from this graph? Observe that before discount-
ing the benefits of its HIV projects, C would spend $675m of its own money on
healthcare, comprising $460m from the unsubsidised projects (see Table 2) and
$215m for its share of the subsidised projects (see Table 3). After discounting
its HIV projects, it is possible to work out from the data of Tables 4 and 5
that C would reduce its spending down to $565m. If D wishes to raise country
funding back to $675m, they can identify the threshold λ∗ which corresponds
to C spending $675m into the system even with the discounted HIV projects.
They may then wish to bargain with C to apply a threshold of λ∗ (which in this
case =$117) rather than $100 per DALY averted as a condition of funding.
3 Model
In this Section, we provide some formal context to the procedure of the previous
Section. We model the interaction between a donor D and country C as a
Stackelberg (or leader-follower) game. D is the leader and makes a decision
about how much to subsidise healthcare programmes; C decides what healthcare
programmes to implement based on the schedule of subsidies on offer, but also
how much to invest in healthcare relative to what we call their “outside option”
- an alternative investment opportunity which is not valued by D. One can think
of the outside option as being the opportunity cost of expenditure on healthcare.
Our model is as follows. We first consider the problem of the donor, D:
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Figure 2: Payments by donor and country as the threshold is varied
max
∑
i∈I
wixi
s.t.
∑
i∈I
δi ≤ Bdonor (DONOR)
δi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I
x ∈ argmax(COUNTRY )
• I = 1, ..., i, ..., n is the index set of a set of healthcare projects
• wi is the (positive) value of healthcare project i to D
• xi are decision variables indicating whether healthcare project i is funded
or not, and the vector of these decision variables is denoted x
• δi are decision variables indicating the level of subsidy provided by D to
healthcare project i
• Bdonor is D’s budget constraint
We comment in particular on the constraint that x ∈ argmax(COUNTRY ).
This is the element of the formulation which makes this a bilevel programme.
The constraint says that the x vector is constrained to be a solution of another
optimisation problem (the “inner problem”, here called COUNTRY ). Proce-
dures to solve such problems are generally highly dependent on the structure of
the inner problem, and are typically not computationally straightfoward.
13
In other words, a critical element of D’s problem is that she does not actually
allocate the funding, she merely decides on a set of subsidies which are used by
C in solving COUNTRY . In this sense D can be thought of as a funding
agency (such as the Global Fund) which provides financing to country partners
and audits results, rather than an implementation agency, such as President’s
Malaria Initiative, which actually runs and manages programmes on the ground,
in-country itself.
C’s problem is as follows:
max
∑
i∈I
vixi + V0x0
s.t.
∑
i∈I
(ci − δi)xi + C0x0 = Bcountry (COUNTRY )
xi ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ I
x0 ∈ [0, 1]
The intended interpretation of this model is as follows:
• vi is the (positive) value of healthcare project i to C and V0 is the value
of the outside option
• ci is the (positive) cost of healthcare project i to C and C0 is the cost of
the outside option
• Bcountry is C’s budget constraint
• x0 is a decision variable indicating the extent to which the outside option
is funded
One possibly contentious feature of this model is the linearity of the outside
option. This assumption can be considered as justified by a sort of Taylor-series
assumption - there are many opportunities for government investment in the
public sector outside health, and so the local gradient of the production function
may be approximately linear. A more pragmatic assumption is that relaxing this
assumption of linearity seems to lead to a problem which is more complicated
to solve. Another assumption is that the budget constraint is fixed, but it might
be that an injection of the donor funds changes the government budget (quite
possibly downwards). This assumption we justify as being reasonable when
the government budget is relatively large: also it is necessary to advance the
analysis.
It may be objected that the value delivered by projects will not scale in a
linear way, on the grounds that one would treat the sickest who have greater
capacity to benefit first: we reply that this is a modelling rather than a mathe-
matical decision, as in the mathematics there is no minimum size of a “project”
– in the extreme case a project could just involve treating one person. We also
note that our model assumes that projects can be implemented independently
of one another - there are no shared costs or jointly delivered benefits.
We make the following assumption on the parameters of the model:
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Assumption 1
∑
i∈I
ci < Bcountry < C0
This assumption can be seen as locating the country as a middle income
country in a very direct way: it could fund all healthcare projects currently on
the table out of its domestic budget, but this domestic budget is swamped by
competing claims from other sectors of government. (The technical reasons for
having this assumption will become clear in the course of the proof of Proposition
1.)
Proposition 1 For every optimal solution to DONOR problem, there exists
an optimal solution to the following integer knapsack problem KPD and vice
versa.
max
∑
i∈I
wixi
s.t.
∑
i∈I
∆ixi ≤ Bdonor (KPD)
xi ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ I
where ∆i = ci−
viC0
V 0 for all Im ⊆ I which are defined as the set of marginal
projects {i : vi < ciV0/C0} and ∆i = 0 for all other projects i /∈ Im
Proof. We show this by proving that for an optimal solution to one problem,
there exists a feasible solution to the other problem and vice versa.
⇒ Let x∗, be an optimal solution to KPD. First make a quick observation
that the optimal solution we consider will have x∗i = 1 for i /∈ Im. If not,
we can make its value one and we will only to increase the objective value (as
wi ≥ 0) and we will not violate the budget constraint (as ∆i = 0). Define
I∗m := {i ∈ Im : x
∗
i = 1} and ∆
∗
i := ∆ix
∗
i , for all i ∈ I. We will first show that
the (x∗,∆∗) is a feasible solution to DONOR. In order to do that we need to
first show that there exists a x∗0, such that (x
∗, x∗0) is an optimal solution to the
COUNTRY (∆∗) (problem COUNTRY with the subsidy parameter as ∆∗).
We claim that
x∗0 =
BCOUNTRY −
∑
i/∈Im
ci −
∑
i∈I∗
m
(ci −∆
∗
i )
c0
.
In order to see this we will take any feasible solution (x˜, x˜0) to COUNTRY (∆
∗)
and systematically convert x˜ into x∗ and show that in this process the objective
function only increases. We will now perform the following three operations on
(x˜, x˜0):
• If x˜i = 0 for some i /∈ Im, then we can make x˜i = 1 and decrease x˜0 by
ci
c0
(which we can always do by the first inequality of Assumption 1). Since
vi
ci
≥ V0C0 , this will only increase the objective function value. Similarly, we
can do this for all i /∈ Im with x˜i = 0.
• Next, for some i ∈ Im/I
∗
m with x˜i = 1, we can reduce it to zero and
increase x˜0 by
ci
C0
(which we can always do by the second inequality of
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Assumption 1). Notice that doing this will strictly increase the objective
value since ∆∗i = 0 and
vi
ci
< V0C0
• Finally, for some i ∈ Im with x˜i = 0, we can increase it to one and decrease
x˜i by
ci−∆
∗
i
C0
(which we can always do by the first inequality of Assumption
1). This will not alter the objective value because vici−∆∗i
= V0C0 .
Clearly we have set all x˜i = 0 for all i ∈ Im/I
∗
m and x˜i = 1 for all i ∈ I
∗
m and
i /∈ Im, which is exactly x
∗. It is also easy to notice that after performing the
above operations we get x˜0 = x
∗
0. Therefore x
∗ ∈ argmax(COUNTRY ), and
thus it satisfies the third constraint of DONOR. This ends the proof in one
direction.
⇐ Let (x∗, δ∗) be the optimal solution to DONOR. We have to show that
x∗ is a feasible solution to KPD. We will only focus on i ∈ Im with x
∗
i = 1.
Any other project, i, will not affect the feasibility of KPD, since we either have
∆i = 0 (when i /∈ Im) or we have x
∗
i = 0. For some i ∈ Im with x
∗
i = 1, we
should notice that δ∗i ≥ ci −
viC0
V0
. Let us assume the contrary: δ∗i < ci −
viC0
V0
.
If we reduce the value of x∗i to 0 and increase the value of x
∗
0 by
ci−δ
∗
i
C0
, then
the objective value of COUNTRY (δ∗) would strictly increase by a value of
V0
ci−δ
∗
i
C0
−vi, because V0
ci−δ
∗
i
C0
−vi > 0 by assumption. This is a contradiction to
the optimality of (x∗, x∗0) to COUNTRY (δ
∗). So we indeed have δ∗i ≥ ci−
viC0
V0
.
But from the feasibility of (x∗, δ∗) to DONOR, we have
∑
i∈I
δ∗i ≤ BDONOR
From the above claim we just proved, we have
∑
i∈I
∆ix
∗
i ≤
∑
i∈I
δ∗i
Hence the first constraint of KPD is satisfied and this completes the proof.
The problem KPD is easily solvable using standard software. We find the
solutions for the example we introduced in the previous section using the Solver
add-in for MSExcel. First we solve the version of the problem in which D and C
have the same benefit coefficients. The DALYs gained which can be attributed
to projects subsidised by D for the optimal solutions, and the amount of country
finance leveraged in thereby, are shown for a range of budget levels in Figures
3A and 3B. It can be seen that the shape of the curves appear similar: in fact
they are identical. The reason for this is that each DALY attributable to a
project subsidised by D has to be matched by exactly $100 from C.
Figure 4A and 4B show the corresponding graphs for the example where
D and C have different benefit coefficients because C discounts the benefits of
the HIV projects. Here the shapes are markedly different. It may be observed
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that the curve of Figure 4B looks somehow “more irregular” than that of the
other figures, and indeed it is non-monotonic, ie does not always increase as the
budget increases. This is because C’s priority ordering is quite different from
D’s, so sometimes D may have to put a relatively small amount of money to
induce C do to something D regards as relatively attractive, and sometimes a
relatively large sum of money to do something D sees as unappealing.
Although it is not difficult to solve the model KPD computationally, the
model can also be solved heuristically using the approach of Section 2. The ap-
proach of Section 2 is not truly optimal: to see this consider the case where D has
a budget of $300,000 and has three investment opportunities: two each involve
involve subsidising $200,000 and saving 20 lives (at $100,000 per life saved),
and the other involves subsidising $300,000 and saving 25 lives(at $120,000 per
life saved). Although the $300,000 subsidy is clearly the least cost-effective of
the three, it is also the optimal choice, saving five more lives than either of
the other two options, because the fixed budget means that at most one of the
three investment opportunities available can be selected. However, although not
strictly optimal, the rule of Section 2 has the advantage that it is intuitive and
easy to follow rather than going through a “blackbox” algorithm.
4 Discussion
A common criticism of development aid is that it distorts local country priorities
and an important principle underlying recent discourse on aid effectiveness is
“country ownership”: aid recipients should set and lead their own development
strategies, and use aid in pursuing these strategies, rather than having their
priorities dictated by outside parties (OECD, 2005/2008). Can the model we
have outlined be used in a way which is consistent with this important principle?
In our example and in our model we do not assume that the donor and the
country have a common valuation of the healthcare projects which are on the
table. (The donor’s vector of benefit coefficients are w and the country’s is
v.) There could be many reasons for this. For example, donors and countries
may differ in terms of time horizon or in terms of risk attitude. Alternatively,
donors may have a mandate only to fund particular diseases, or only diseases
of particularly subpopulations (e.g. children), or they may be particularly con-
cerned about global public goods, and so be prepared to support stewardship
initiatives which protect against the development of drug resistant pathogens.
More fundamentally, donors and countries may have different preferences for
the various dimensions of health or even philosophical perspectives on the value
of healthcare: for example, countries may justify spending on healthcare on the
basis of economic benefits, but donors may prioritise based on reduction of the
burden of disease, as measured in Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) or
some similar metric.
In short, our model captures a situation in which there is a partnership
between parties of overlapping, but not identical, interests and perspectives.
This is in our view, an accurate description of the situation in development aid,
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and is entirely compatible with country ownership, explicitly acknowledging
that the country may have their own objectives which differ from those of the
donor.
We believe that acknowledging that such differences exist is essential for an
open and respectful dialogue between donor and country about aid which can
lead to an arrangement in which there is genuine country ownership. In practice,
donors subject country plans to technical evaluation to ensure that the benefits
which aid is intended to bring will actually be realised. This is not in itself an
infringement of country ownership, as it is intended to help the country realise
its own stated objectives.
Our model should not be understood as providing an algorithm for aid al-
location but rather a starting point for discussion between donor and country.
Given that resources are limited, it is reasonable for donors to initiate discussions
by offering to fund expensive treatments for multi-drug resistant tuberculosis,
on the basis that countries should fund highly cost-effective interventions (e.g.
condom provision for sex workers or men who have sex with men) themselves
if they are wealthy enough to do so. In return, if the country can offer some
compelling and legitimate argument why this is not feasible in their context, it
is incumbent on donors to think again.
An important issue arising from our model and which must be addressed
through such a dialogue is the nature of what we have called the “outside op-
tion”. Donors, like the Global Fund, may have a mandate which is focussed on
particular diseases. This does not mean that they can be blind to the impact of
their actions on the rest of the health system, or indeed, the rest of the public
sector. Our model is provides donors with an allocation rule which encourages
countries to invest in health services, if that is their priority. If this encour-
ages countries to implement progressive taxation or crack down on corruption,
or reign in aggressive military expenditure in order to raise funds, this is to be
welcomed. If on the other hand, countries respond to these incentives by raiding
the education budget, this may not be on balance good for the local population.
Such considerations cannot in our view by taken into account by algorithm:
there is no substitute for a context-sensitive appraisal of what is happening in
country.
An important benefit of the decision rule we suggest is that it (provably, in
the context of our model), leverages donor financing by encouraging countries to
invest their own money. Moreover, the decision rule suggested by our model is
consistent with the recent push for “sustainable” aid. A financial model where
the most cost-effective and thus the most basic services of the health system
are financed by outside partners is not a sustainable model. As countries move
through the development cycle, they must take on responsibility for funding
the core of their healthcare system themselves. By choosing judiciously how
to allocate their funds, in consultation with countries, donors can add value by
topping up health system provision, enabling countries to afford technologies
and treatments which would otherwise be beyond their reach.
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5 Conclusion
The world has made significant progress in the improving human health over the
last several years. However, many people still lack access to the healthcare they
need. This is in part because resources are inevitably limited, but also because
the resources which are available are often misallocated. Health economics and
health economists have a huge potential contribution to make to providing sys-
tematic methods to ensure decision makers use these limited resources in the
best possible way.
Chalkidou et al (2016) have argued that although the core principles un-
derlying sound and defensible priority setting are the same everywhere, specific
solutions have to be tailored to local contexts and problems. The argument of
our paper is that this is particularly the case for global donors. Global donors
have a responsibility to use funds wisely and this means working in partnership
with countries to support countries in developing their own healthcare systems
(Kanpirom et al, 2017). The argument of this paper is that the standard al-
gorithm of cost-effectiveness analysis - prioritise in value for money order - is
not appropriate where countries do have the wherewithal to share costs. In-
stead, donors should consider subsidising interventions which are marginal for
countries, so as to maximally leverage indigenous country financing. Such a
decision rule has the attractive feature that it encourages countries to adopt
sustainable financing arrangements, where the most cost-effective components
of the healthcare system are funded directly out of core government revenues.
The model we propose is eminently practical as estimates for the key pa-
rameters are widely available. For example, the last few years have seen lively
discussion of the estimation and role of country-level cost-effectiveness thresh-
olds (Bertram et al, 2016; Woods et al., 2016), which can be thought of as
playing the role of the outside option in our model. Although these estimates
are not perfect, the more they are seen to play a role in decision making via
models like that proposed here, the faster the quality of these estimates will
improve. Although we believe it is currently fit for purpose, the model offers
scope for development by relaxing assumptions such as project independence,
integrality, and certainty about key coefficients. Developing more general mod-
els (for example incorporating constraints on non-monetary resources such as
staff, incorporating uncertainty on the part of the donor about how the country
frames its optimisation problem) is a technically demanding task, and is left as
a challenge for future research in this area.
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Figure 3: Improvements in health and increases in country spending as donor
budget scales up (benefit coefficients identical for donor and country)
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Figure 4: Improvements in health and increases in country spending as donor
budget scales up (benefit coefficients different for donor and country)
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